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INCREMENTALIST VS. MAXIMALIST REFORM: 
SOLITARY CONFINEMENT CASE STUDIES 
Margo Schlanger 
ABSTRACT—Among criminal justice reformers, it has long been hotly 
contested whether moderate reform helps or harms more efforts to achieve 
more thoroughgoing change. With respect to solitary confinement, do partial 
and ameliorative measures undermine the goal of solitary confinement 
abolition? Or do reformist campaigns advance—albeit incrementally—that 
ultimate goal? Call this a debate between “incrementalists” and 
“maximalists.” I offer this Essay as an appeal for empirical rather than 
aesthetic inquiry into the question. After summarizing nationwide reform 
litigation efforts that began in the 1970s, I try to shed some factual light by 
examining solitary reform efforts in two states, Massachusetts and Indiana. 
In Massachusetts, early incremental reforms may be providing a blueprint 
for deeper depopulation of solitary confinement—though the matter is still 
highly contested. In Indiana, incremental reforms seem to be less effective 
at achieving deeper depopulation. I offer some hypotheses about the sources 
of the difference. 
The evidence suggests that for litigation to trigger broad reform, or 
significant steps towards solitary abolition, allies are required. In 
Massachusetts, the political ecosystem has many more reform-minded 
participants—activists, lawyers, judges, legislators—than does the much 
redder Indiana. Each such participant can build on the others. In 
Massachusetts, litigation’s strengths—information generation, thoughtful 
policy development (codified in settlement documents), publicity, and 
storytelling—can emerge. Weaknesses—the detachment of litigation from 
mobilization, hyper-empowerment of lawyers, undue affection for process—
are ameliorated by other actors and other actions. The Indiana ecosystem is 
far less hospitable to solitary confinement change. 
There is no sign that the limited reformist measures in Massachusetts 
and Indiana have been perverse, as maximalists might predict. Neither state 
has seen an increase in the use of solitary confinement or reported worsening 
of conditions in solitary. In neither state is there any sign that the litigated 
amelioration of solitary confinement has entrenched or legitimated solitary 
confinement more broadly. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Solitary confinement and efforts to reform it are as old as American 
imprisonment.1 And when modern long-term solitary confinement emerged 
in the early 1980s with the rise of the “supermax,”2 a reform movement 
followed essentially immediately. Many or even most of the modern 
movement’s advocates have made it their goal to abolish solitary, not merely 
reduce it: the American Friends Service Committee, for example, named its 
campaign STOPMAX,3 and the ACLU calls its successor campaign Stop 
Solitary.4 But, as described below, much of the advocacy, and particularly 
 
 1 See, e.g., David J. Rothman, Perfecting the Prison: United States, 1789–1865, in THE OXFORD 
HISTORY OF THE PRISON: THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT IN WESTERN SOCIETY 111, 116–24 (Norval 
Morris & David J. Rothman eds., 1995). 
 2 See CHASE RIVELAND, NAT’L INST. OF CORR., SUPERMAX PRISONS: OVERVIEW AND GENERAL 
CONSIDERATIONS 1, 5 (1999). 
 3 See Healing Justice, AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMMITTEE, https://www.afsc.org/stopmax 
[https://perma.cc/4KJW-PLK3]. 
 4 See We Can Stop Solitary, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/prisoners-rights/solitary-
confinement/we-can-stop-solitary [https://perma.cc/DZD6-XKKC]. 
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the litigation, has been more modest—seeking to tighten up the procedure 
used to assign prisoners to solitary, improve the conditions within solitary, 
and bar particularly vulnerable populations (prisoners with serious mental 
illness, pregnant women, and so on) from solitary. 
With respect to criminal justice more generally—and, indeed, left-
leaning campaigns altogether—it has long been hotly contested whether 
moderate reform helps or harms more thoroughgoing advocacy efforts 
(consider the current prison abolition and “defund the police” movements). 
Do partial and ameliorative measures undermine the goal of solitary 
confinement abolition? Or do they advance—albeit incrementally—that 
ultimate goal?5 
Call adherents to the incrementalism-skeptical position “maximalists.” 
There are two chief maximalist arguments. First, a normalization argument6 
suggests that modest reforms tend to normalize the use of solitary 
confinement—to imply that solitary confinement is acceptable if it is hedged 
by the right procedures, softened by the right environmental conditions, and 
imposed on the right populations.7 For example, arguing that solitary is 
particularly inappropriate for certain populations of prisoners can be 
 
 5 To try to shed light on this question, I lean on the written sources cited throughout and on telephone 
interviews I conducted with over a dozen experienced prisoners’ rights advocates: Tom Crishon, 
Managing Att’y, Ind. Disability Rights (Mar. 11, 2020); Philip Desgranges, Senior Staff Att’y, NYCLU, 
& Alex Reinert, Max Freund Professor of Litig. & Advocacy & Dir., Ctr. for Rights & Justice, Cardozo 
Law Sch. (Oct. 15, 2019); Kenneth Falk, Legal Dir. ACLU of Ind. (Feb. 6 & 11, 2020); Jamie Fellner, 
former Senior Counsel for the U.S. Program of Human Rights Watch (Feb. 13, 2020); Amy Fettig, then-
Deputy Dir., ACLU Nat’l Prison Project & Dir., ACLU Stop Solitary Campaign (Oct. 23, 2019); Maggie 
Filler, Att’y, MacArthur Justice Ctr. (Feb. 13, 2020); Robert Fleischner, former Att’y, Ctr. for Pub. 
Representation & member, Mass. Restrictive Hous. Oversight Comm. (Oct. 15, 2019); Melissa Keyes, 
Exec. Dir., Ind. Disability Rights (Feb. 13, 2020); Rachel Meeropol, Senior Staff Att’y, Ctr. for 
Constitutional Rights (Oct. 16, 2019); Karen Murtagh, Exec. Dir., Prisoners’ Legal Servs. of N.Y. (Nov. 
15, 2019); James Pingeon, Litig. Dir., Prisoners’ Legal Servs. of Mass. (Oct. 21, 2019); Kelly Tautges, 
Pro Bono Counsel & Dir., Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP & Dan Kelley, Assoc., Faegre Drinker 
Biddle & Reath LLP (Mar. 12, 2020). I also come to the topic with substantial advocacy experience of 
my own, which obviously influences my analysis. 
 6 For an analysis in the context of death penalty abolitionist work that separates normalization into 
“entrenchment” and “legitimation,” see Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Lessons for Law Reform 
from the American Experiment with Capital Punishment, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 748–54 (2014) 
[hereinafter Steiker & Steiker, Lessons for Law Reform]; Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Should 
Abolitionists Support Legislative “Reform” of the Death Penalty?, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 417, 421–24 (2002) 
[hereinafter Steiker & Steiker, Legislative “Reform”]. On these accounts, entrenchment “occurs when 
incremental reform unequivocally offers improvements along some key dimension or dimensions of the 
problem and thus makes the case for larger-scale change less urgent,” and legitimation “occurs when 
incremental reforms promote an exaggerated or false confidence (in the reliability, fairness, wisdom, etc.) 
of the system or practice subject to reform.” Steiker & Steiker, Lessons for Law Reform, supra, at 749. 
When I refer to “normalization,” I intend to encompass both.   
 7 See Keramet Reiter, The International Persistence and Resilience of Solitary Confinement, 8 OÑATI 
SOCIO-LEGAL SERIES 247, 255 (2018). 
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understood to accede to its appropriateness for others. Thus, maximalists 
argue, vulnerable-populations reforms may entrench the practice of solitary 
confinement for some prisoners, even as those reforms rule out solitary for 
others. Professor Keramet Reiter writes, along these lines: 
[R]eform efforts targeting protected categories like the young, or the mentally 
ill, or more recently, pregnant women, leave behind a core of people who are 
not young, not (yet) mentally ill, not pregnant, and therefore not deserving of 
protection. This durable core of punishable subjects becomes an ongoing 
justification for the need for solitary confinement . . . . In sum, many attempts 
to improve conditions of confinement in solitary, or to limit its imposition on 
some vulnerable groups, have been positive, reformist efforts, ultimately 
bolstering the legitimacy of the existing system, rather than negative, non-
reformist or abolitionist, efforts, with the potential to challenge the legitimacy 
of systems of solitary confinement.8  
The second chief maximalist argument is about bandwidth and is 
conceptually distinct. It points to the hard-to-escape reality that reform 
attention is scarce.9 If that limited resource is used up on, for example, 
barring pregnant women from solitary, that leaves the vast majority of 
prisoners with less advocacy energy devoted to their situations. 
In contrast to maximalists, “incrementalists” believe that a modest 
approach is often best suited to bring about the shared abolitionist (or close-
to-abolitionist) goal. Incrementalists argue that shrinking the number of 
prisoners in solitary will help not just those who are rehoused in less brutal 
conditions, but also those who remain in solitary. The normalization problem 
can be avoided, they say, by careful framing and empathetic language. This 
is how prisoners’ rights lawyer Jim Pingeon describes his anti-solitary 
litigation efforts, which have been decidedly incremental: 
The whole debate . . . was framed . . . . It wasn’t just, “Solitary is a terrible 
place, but some people can tolerate it,” it [was,] “Solitary is terrible and it’s 
really, really terrible for some people and we should absolutely make sure that 
they don’t go there, but we should also start making it harder for anybody to go 
there. And I think that that message was a fairly effective one and certainly 
more effective than if you just said, “Well, [solitary is] bad for everyone.”10 
And Amy Fettig, then-head of the ACLU’s Stop Solitary campaign, puts it 
this way: 
 
 8 Id. (citation omitted). 
 9 See Proceedings of a Colloquium to Further a National Consensus on Ending the Over-Use of 
Extreme Isolation in Prisons, JOHN JAY C. OF JUST. (2015). 
 10 Telephone Interview with James Pingeon, supra note 5. 
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[I]f you raise up the worst case first, [the cases] that people can identify with—
kids, folks with mental illness, pregnant women—you actually normalize 
change within corrections so that they are examples of other things that 
work . . . . [E]specially when we’re dealing with these closed institutions, we 
can’t actually create change on the ground unless there is some willingness on 
the part of those institutions to change. And so [incremental reform is] actually 
softening up the ground. It’s building the skill base and, frankly, the moral 
framework, for change to happen. Then social forces on the outside actually 
effectuate real change on the inside.11 
As Fettig makes clear, incrementalists offer arguments about increasing 
technocratic capacity, suggesting that in moving a particular group of 
prisoners out of solitary, prison and jail officials develop alternative housing 
and custody strategies and facilities, which can then be extended. Solving a 
slice of a problem may enable officials to see how they can address the 
remainder—as long as the remainder continues to be perceived as a problem. 
It is the role of advocates to ensure that solitary confinement continues to be 
seen as a problem. Incrementalists often argue, too, that bandwidth 
limitations actually cut in favor of incrementalism because once the most 
egregious suffering from solitary is solved—the most vulnerable prisoners 
taken out of solitary confinement, for example—reform can move on to 
focus on slightly less urgent but more widespread issues. In addition, 
economies of scale may mean that when supermax solitary units are 
sufficiently depopulated, their elevated per-prisoner cost may become 
unsustainable politically. 
The incrementalist versus maximalist debate is a cousin of the standard 
liberal versus left debate opposing ameliorationist reform to deeper, more 
structural, more radical action. In the particular setting of solitary 
confinement, where maximalists and incrementalists largely share a 
maximalist goal and disagree only about strategy, the anti-incrementalist 
argument sounds in perversity—it claims that reformers’ attempts to 
improve or minimize solitary confinement will not only fail, but are 
counterproductive, entrenching and worsening the existing cruel system.12 
Professor Albert Hirschman, in The Rhetoric of Reaction: Perversity, 
Futility, Jeopardy, analyzes the appeal of the perversity argument as a 
reactionary trope: “What better way to show [a reformer] up as half foolish 
 
 11 Telephone Interview with Amy Fettig, supra note 5. 
 12 The three paragraphs that follow are adapted from my own prior work. See Margo Schlanger, No 
Reason to Blame Liberals (Or, The Unbearable Lightness of Perversity Arguments), NEW RAMBLER 
(June 15, 2015) (reviewing NAOMI MURAKAWA, THE FIRST CIVIL RIGHT: HOW LIBERALS BUILT PRISON 
AMERICA (2014)), https://newramblerreview.com/book-reviews/law/no-reason-to-blame-liberals-or-the-
unbearable-lightness-of-perversity-arguments [https://perma.cc/QD7Q-PT5W]. 
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and half criminal than to prove that he is achieving the exact opposite of what 
he is proclaiming as his objective?”13 Professor Hirschman argues that 
conservatives are particularly drawn to perversity arguments because they 
are a way to deride purportedly public-spirited reform.14 This nicely 
supplements the conservative commitment to self-interest that (via the 
invisible hand doctrine of Adam Smith15) serves the public good. But as 
Professor Hirschman says, perversity arguments are not “the exclusive 
property of ‘reactionaries.’”16 And actually, perversity arguments are just as 
much a hallmark of left/radical attacks on liberalism/reformism. A classic 
radical argument, founded in Marxist dialectical thought, is to promote 
drastic but salutary change (that is, revolution) by making the current state 
of affairs more intolerable. The idea, often tagged with the imperative 
“heighten the contradictions,” is that if things get worse for the oppressed, 
that will spur much needed radical solutions. The concomitant claim is that 
moderate reform, by dulling “contradictions,” perversely makes things 
worse for its purported beneficiaries.17 
Indeed, perversity arguments are appealing not only to reactionaries and 
the left-of-liberal left but to academics, regardless of ideology. As Professor 
Hirschman said, a perversity argument “is, at first blush, a daring intellectual 
maneuver. The structure of the argument is admirably simple, whereas the 
claim being made is rather extreme.”18 Perversity arguments are 
counterintuitive, attention-grabbing. These are attractive characteristics if 
the goal is to stand out in a crowd of monographs. And sure enough, the 
attack on liberalism as perversely harming the disempowered has become 
quite fashionable in criminal justice scholarship in particular. Professor Bill 
Stuntz was its most well-known (and perhaps least radical) author, but 
structurally similar claims have sprouted up all over, usually from the left. 
These are arguments that prison-conditions litigation causes an increase in 
 
 13 ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, THE RHETORIC OF REACTION: PERVERSITY, FUTILITY, JEOPARDY 19 
(1991). 
 14 See id. at 12. 
 15 See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 456 
(R. H. Campbell, A. S. Skinner & W. B. Todd eds., Liberty Classics 1976) (1776). 
 16 HIRSCHMAN, supra note 13, at 7. 
 17 See, e.g., VLADIMIR ILYICH LENIN, The Heritage We Renounce, reprinted in 2 LENIN’S 
COLLECTED WORKS (George Hanna ed., Yuri Sdobnikov & George Hanna trans., Progress Publishers 
1972) (1898), https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1897/dec/31c.htm 
[https://perma.cc/WD9E-9RKR]; ROSA LUXEMBURG, REFORM OR REVOLUTION (1900), 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/luxemburg/1900/reform-revolution/ [https://perma.cc/7VDN-AZ8Q]. 
 18 HIRSCHMAN, supra note 13, at 11. 
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incarceration,19 Miranda rights cause increased arrests,20 and so on. The 
claims are empirical—A caused B—but the arguments are usually a 
combination of ideological and hypothetical. 
Professor Hirschman warned us, however, that notwithstanding the 
aesthetic appeal of perversity arguments, we should be on our guard against 
them: “[T]he perverse effect is widely appealed to . . . [but] unlikely to exist 
‘out there’ to anything like the extent that is claimed.”21 So, with respect to 
solitary confinement, I offer this Essay as an appeal for empirical rather than 
aesthetic inquiry. Empirically, who has the better of the argument—the 
maximalists or the incrementalists? To try to shed some light on how these 
issues play out in fact rather than in theory, I examine solitary reform efforts 
in two states, Massachusetts and Indiana. In Massachusetts, early 
incremental reforms may be providing a blueprint for deeper depopulation 
of solitary confinement—though the matter is still highly contested. In 
Indiana, incremental reforms seem to be less effective at achieving deeper 
depopulation. I explain and offer some hypotheses about the sources of the 
difference. In neither state, however, is there any sign of a perverse effect, 
where reform actually increases the problem it purports to oppose. 
For contextualization of the state-by-state stories, in Part I, I summarize 
the nationwide reform litigation efforts in which they have been situated. In 
Part II, I provide the case studies of Massachusetts and Indiana. In Part III, I 
offer analysis of those case studies. 
 
 19 Heather Schoenfeld, Mass Incarceration and the Paradox of Prison Conditions Litigation, 
44 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 731, 733 (2010). 
 20 William J. Stuntz, Miranda’s Mistake, 99 MICH. L. REV. 975, 976 (2001) (“Miranda imposes only 
the slightest of costs on the police, and its existence may well forestall more serious, and more successful, 
regulation of police questioning. . . . Its effects are probably small, perhaps vanishingly so. But what 
effects it has are probably perverse—a conclusion that holds, oddly enough, no matter which side of the 
left-right divide one is on.”). 
 21 HIRSCHMAN, supra note 13, at 35. 
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I. NATIONWIDE WAVES OF LITIGATED REFORM 
A. Early Challenges to Solitary Confinement 
Prisoners’ federal civil rights lawsuits began in earnest22 in the mid-
1960s,23 and grew quickly in both volume and scope in the 1970s. Federal 
judges began by ratifying complaints about in-prison violations of generally 
applicable constitutional guarantees (such as the Equal Protection Clause or 
the First Amendment)24 but soon started to entertain seriously claims that the 
Eighth Amendment’s prescription against “cruel and unusual punishments” 
provided a judicially enforceable right to at least minimally adequate prison 
conditions. The first such cases involved prison discipline—corporal 
punishment and conditions in disciplinary isolation—presumably because 
these were easiest to conceptualize as “punishment” separable from the 
sentence of incarceration.25 
In 1966, for example, after what may have been the first civil rights 
prison conditions trial, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
 
 22 There were cases prior to the 1960s, but rarely. And among the earliest U.S. prisoners’ rights 
litigation were cases attacking torturous solitary conditions—for example, stress-position restraints. See 
In re Birdsong, in which Federal District Judge Emory Speer held that a federal prisoner’s Eighth 
Amendment rights had been violated by a county jailer who fed him just bread and water for a maximum 
period of three days and chained him “in solitude” by the neck to a grate in his cell at night “so that he 
could not put his heels to the ground.” 39 F. 599, 601–03 (S.D. Ga. 1889). 
 23 I have previously described the erosion of barriers to such litigation from the 1940s through the 
1960s. Margo Schlanger, The Constitutional Law of Incarceration, Reconfigured, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 
357, 368 (2018); see also Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 548–49 (1941) (barring official censorship 
practices that prevented prisoners’ petitions from even arriving at federal courthouses); Monroe v. Pape, 
365 U.S. 167, 171–87 (1961) (reviving 42 U.S.C. § 1983, providing prisoner plaintiffs a jurisdictional 
path into federal court); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667–68 (1962) (holding the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishments” applicable to states and local 
governments); Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546, 546 (1964) (reversing categorical exclusion of prisoners 
from enforcement of Bill of Rights protection). 
 24 See, e.g., Pierce v. La Vallee, 293 F.2d 233, 235 (2d Cir. 1961) (“[W]e feel constrained to hold . . . 
that the present complaints, with their charges of religious persecution, state a claim under the Civil Rights 
Act which the district court should entertain.”); Cooper, 378 U.S. at 546; Sostre v. McGinnis, 334 F.2d 
906, 908 (2d Cir. 1964) (“To the extent that it is a religion those who profess to follow its teaching have 
some measure of constitutional protection, even though they are confined to prison and are subject to 
prison discipline.”), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 892 (1964). 
 25 See, e.g., Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674, 684 (N.D. Cal. 1966) (finding that conditions in 
isolation constituted cruel and unusual punishment); Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519, 521–26 (2d Cir. 
1967) (finding the harsh conditions to which the prisoner was subjected constituted cruel and unusual 
punishment); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579–81 (8th Cir. 1968) (holding whipping of prisoners 
unconstitutional); see also Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370, 378–79 (D.D.C. 1962) (holding 
confinement in “control cell” for prison rule violations unconstitutional because disproportionate to 
offense); cf. Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1031–34 (2d Cir. 1973) (Friendly, J.) (discussing scope of 
the application of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments to prison 
conditions). 
115:273 (2020)  Incrementalist vs. Maximalist Reform 
281 
California issued an order regulating solitary confinement cells—an 
important instrument of control in that state’s prison system. The court 
enjoined the State to provide “the basic requirements which are essential to 
life, and . . . such essential requirements as may be necessary to maintain a 
degree of cleanliness compatible with elemental decency in accord with the 
standards of a civilized community.”26 In a suit about the isolation unit of 
New York’s Clinton State Prison at Dannemora, the Second Circuit quoted 
the plaintiff’s description of the strip-cell in which he had been placed: 
[T]he said solitary confinement cell wherein plaintiff was placed was dirty, 
filthy and unsanitary, without adequate heat and virtually barren; the toilet and 
sink were encrusted with slime, dirt and human excremental residue 
superimposed thereon; plaintiff was without clothing and entirely nude for 
several days [elsewhere said to be 11 days] until he was given a thin pair of 
underwear to put on; plaintiff was unable to keep himself clean or perform 
normal hygienic functions as he was denied the use of soap, towel, toilet paper, 
tooth brush, comb, and other hygienic implements and utensils therefore; 
plaintiff was compelled under threat of violence, assault or other increased 
punishments to remain standing at military attention in front of his cell door 
each time an officer appeared from 7:30 A.M. to 10:00 P.M. every day, and he 
was not permitted to sleep during the said hours under the pain and threat of 
being beaten or otherwise disciplined therefore; the windows in front of his 
confinement cell were opened wide throughout the evening and night hours of 
each day during subfreezing temperatures causing plaintiff to be exposed to the 
cold air and winter weather without clothing or other means of protecting 
himself or to escape the detrimental effects thereof; and the said solitary 
confinement cell was used as a means of subjecting plaintiff to oppression, 
excessively harsh, cruel and inhuman treatment specifically forbidden by the 
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.27 
The court held that such conditions would violate the Eighth Amendment.28 
While many other contemporaneous court decisions rejected similar 
lawsuits,29 among the most influential of the early cases was Gates v. 
 
 26 Jordan, 257 F. Supp. at 683; Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Jordan v. Fitzharris, No. 44786 
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 1965), available at https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-CA-0008-
0005.pdf [https://perma.cc/6Y6D-ZARE]; Resubmission for Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, Jordan 
v. Fitzharris, No. 43983 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 1965), available at https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/ 
public/PC-CA-0008-0004.pdf [https://perma.cc/RX3Z-9MLZ]. Plaintiff’s counsel, Charles Cohler, had 
been appointed by the court and pursued a legal theory that had been pleaded by his client, Robert Charles 
Jordan, Jr., a prolific and accomplished writ-writer. Telephone Interview with Charles B. Cohler (Mar. 
16, 1999). 
 27 Wright, 387 F.2d at 521 (alterations in original). 
 28 Id. at 525. 
 29 See, for example, Sostre, 442 F.2d at 191–94, and cases cited therein. 
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Collier,30 a broad-gauge reform litigation that successfully challenged race 
segregation and conditions at the Mississippi State Penitentiary, known as 
Parchman Farm.31 In Gates, the district court enjoined all forms of corporal 
punishment, including “[b]eating,” “[s]hooting,” “[a]dministering milk of 
magnesia” (a laxative), “[t]urning fans on inmates while they are naked and 
wet,” and “[u]sing a cattle prod.”32 The court also regulated solitary 
confinement: 
Defendants, and persons in privity with them, are further enjoined from 
confining any inmate in disciplinary segregation or isolation at MSU or 
elsewhere, including “dark hole” cells, except under the following conditions: 
(a) The inmates so confined shall receive the same daily ration of food which is 
provided to the general prison population, and in no event shall such inmates 
receive less than 2000 calories per day; 
(b) The inmates shall be permitted to wear normal institutional clothing unless 
the prison physician orders otherwise for a particular inmate; 
(c) The inmates so confined shall be supplied with soap, towels, toothbrush and 
shaving utensils; 
(d) All disciplinary cells shall be equipped with adequate bedding, including 
mattresses, clean sheets and blankets. Adequate bedding may be withheld only 
if an inmate misuses or destroys such supplies; 
(e) All disciplinary cells shall be adequately heated, ventilated and maintained 
in a sanitary condition at all times; 
(f) No inmate shall be confined in any isolation cell referred to as a dark hole 
for a period in excess of 24 hours.33 
As prison conditions cases multiplied, this type of order became fairly 
typical. Professor Keramet Reiter summarizes the case law as of the 1980s: 
[I]mprovements to isolation conditions . . . were ordered again and again by 
courts across the country . . . . [and included]: (l) requirements that prisoners 
have access to some basic routines of daily life, like showers and regular 
outdoor exercise; (2) requirements that prisoners have minimum physical 
comforts, largely geared toward avoiding health problems, such as provisions 
for adequate lighting as well as adequate hygiene, and limitations on noise; (3) 
requirements that prisoners be physically safe from attacks by other prisoners, 
 
 30 349 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. Miss. 1972), aff’d, 501 F.2d. 1291 (5th Cir. 1974). 
 31 Id. at 885, 895; see also DAVID M. OSHINSKY, “WORSE THAN SLAVERY”: PARCHMAN FARM AND 
THE ORDEAL OF JIM CROW JUSTICE 241–48 (1996). 
 32 349 F. Supp. at 900. 
 33 Id. 
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and relatedly, not be isolated in overcrowded cells; (4) requirements that 
prisoners have some minimal due process protections.34 
B. Limited Supermax Challenges 
The current U.S. solitary confinement regime was inaugurated in the 
early 1980s by the Marion lockdown, a response by the Federal Bureau of 
Prisons to the murder of two correctional officers on the same day in 1983 
at the U.S. Penitentiary in Marion, Illinois.35 Modern solitary confinement 
converted the example set by the lockdown into long-term, high-security 
“supermaxes,”36 which became very fashionable, proliferating rapidly. 
Litigation followed almost immediately. It necessarily looked somewhat 
different than prior litigation had. As Professor Reiter generalizes (perhaps 
a bit overgeneralizes): 
In a sense, supermax prisons represent the opposite of the many abuses courts 
documented in the 1970s and 1980s prison reform cases. The supermax prison 
keeps people in absolute isolation; no overcrowding. The supermax prison is 
brand new—made of clean steel and smooth concrete, with technologically 
advanced central control rooms, from which officers can open and close cell 
doors at the push of a button without even the necessity of human sound, let 
alone contact; no dilapidation, no filth. Heavy doors with perfect seals muffle 
the sounds; no intolerable din. Supermax prisons keep individual prisoners 
contained, each in his own concrete box, for 23–24 h[ours] every day; no 
violence.37 
That is, the supermax prisons built in the 1980s often complied with the 
case law of the 1970s and were thus somewhat litigation resistant. And the 
lower federal courts—pushed to the right by President Reagan’s, and 
eventually President George H. W. Bush’s, nominees38 and by the new 
Rehnquist Court—were growing more reluctant to recognize new rights, 
even in response to new institutional practices. 
 
 34 Keramet Ann Reiter, The Most Restrictive Alternative: A Litigation History of Solitary 
Confinement in U.S. Prisons, 1960–2006, 57 STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y 71, 103 (2012) [hereinafter Reiter, 
The Most Restrictive Alternative]. 
 35 See AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM., THE LESSONS OF MARION: THE FAILURE OF A MAXIMUM 
SECURITY PRISON: A HISTORY AND ANALYSIS, WITH VOICES OF PRISONERS 1 (1985), 
https://www.afsc.org/document/lessons-marion [https://perma.cc/ZPV5-3P38]. 
 36 RIVELAND, supra note 2, at 1, 5–6. 
 37 Reiter, The Most Restrictive Alternative, supra note 34, at 106. 
 38 For a discussion of the existence and magnitude of the rightward shift, and supporting sources, see 
Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions over Time: A Case Study of Jail and Prison Court Orders, 
81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550, 595–96 (2006) [hereinafter Schlanger, Injunctions over Time]. 
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Less than a year after the Marion lockdown, a class action challenged 
Marion’s resultant harsh conditions of confinement under the Eighth 
Amendment. In 1988, the Seventh Circuit rejected that challenge. The 
opinion in Bruscino v. Carlson, by Judge Richard Posner, described 
conditions as “sordid and horrible,” but found them necessitated by 
security.39 The court noted, “If order could be maintained in Marion without 
resort to the harsh methods attacked in this lawsuit, the plaintiffs would have 
a stronger argument that the methods were indeed cruel and unusual 
punishments. But the plaintiffs’ able counsel have no suggestions as to how 
this might be done.”40 
The most significant attack on supermax-type confinement that 
followed was Madrid v. Gomez, a class action challenging conditions of 
confinement at Pelican Bay, a supermax in the far northwest corner of 
California, in rural Del Norte County.41 Filed in 1990 and litigated in front 
of one of the most progressive members of the federal bench, Judge Thelton 
Henderson,42 the eventual ruling in Madrid rejected the plaintiffs’ attempt at 
wholesale reform. In a tremendously detailed and influential 139-page 
opinion issued in 1995, Judge Henderson found that prison staff habitually 
used excessive force against inmates in a variety of situations; that the 
medical and mental health care at Pelican Bay were constitutionally 
inadequate; and that conditions in the Secure Housing Unit (SHU) 
constituted cruel and unusual punishment for prisoners with mental illness, 
brain damage, intellectual disabilities, or borderline personality disorders.43 
But for prisoners not in those “specific population subgroups,” he ruled, 
“[c]onditions in the SHU may well hover on the edge of what is humanly 
tolerable for those with normal resilience, particularly when endured for 
extended periods of time. They do not, however, violate exacting Eighth 
Amendment standards.”44 
 
 39 854 F.2d 162, 164–165 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 40 Id. at 165–66; see also Adams v. Carlson, 488 F.2d 619, 621–22 (7th Cir. 1973) (describing the 
origin of the Marion control unit as a response to prison work stoppages); Jules Lobel, Mass Solitary and 
Mass Incarceration: Explaining the Dramatic Rise in Prolonged Solitary in America’s Prisons, 115 NW. 
U. L. REV. 159 (2020). 
 41 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1280 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
 42 SOUL OF JUSTICE: THELTON HENDERSON’S AMERICAN JOURNEY (California Newsreel 2005), 
http://newsreel.org/video/SOUL-OF-JUSTICE-THELTON-HENDERSON [https://perma.cc/6KK8-
QSSK]. 
 43 Madrid, 889 F. Supp at 1236, 1251, 1258, 1280. 
 44 Id. at 1280. 
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Madrid set the terms of the next two decades of litigated solitary 
confinement advocacy.45 It had well-resourced and expert plaintiffs’ counsel 
in front of the most favorable judge they could hope for. Their target, Pelican 
Bay, had the starkest conditions of any supermax prison in the country.46 If 
they could not win a ruling that such conditions were categorically 
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause, it seemed implausible that anyone else could win a 
similar ruling. And so the prisoners’ rights bar moved on, falling back to two 
more limited types of challenges. First, in cases brought under the Due 
Process Clause, plaintiffs argued that more procedure was required to 
consign a prisoner to solitary confinement. And second, Eighth Amendment 
cases followed the path Judge Henderson had laid out, focusing on special 
populations—groups of prisoners particularly prone to grievous suffering in 
solitary. 
Supreme Court case law closely constrained the first strategy. In 1995, 
Sandin v. Conner held that the Due Process Clause did not even apply to 
most assignments of prisoners to solitary confinement because “segregated 
confinement did not present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in 
which a State might conceivably create a liberty interest.”47 Solitary 
confinement challenges under the Due Process Clause thus had to 
demonstrate first that the regime they challenged was materially different 
from the conditions presented in Sandin based on the term or the conditions 
of confinement. A number of cases pursued this approach. 
The doctrinal results were not, however, terribly impressive. In 2005, 
in Wilkinson v. Austin, the Supreme Court agreed with the prisoner-plaintiffs 
that prisoners did indeed have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in 
avoiding long-term supermax.48 That said, Austin shrank the litigation benefit 
of such a finding, ratifying bare-bones notice and meager hearing rights. In 
an opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court unanimously rejected the 
lower court’s insistence that: a prisoner under consideration for supermax 
classification be provided with “an exhaustive list of grounds believed to 
justify [the] placement” and a summary of the evidence against him; 
prisoners be allowed to present documentary evidence and call witnesses to 
challenge the placement; the state’s classification authority summarize the 
 
 45 For analysis of Madrid’s impact on prison litigation norms more generally, see Schlanger, 
Injunctions over Time, supra note 38, at 618–21. 
 46 See KERAMET REITER, 23/7: PELICAN BAY PRISON AND THE RISE OF LONG-TERM SOLITARY 
CONFINEMENT 19–29 (2016). 
 47 515 U.S. 472, 486 (1995). 
 48 545 U.S. 209, 224 (2005). 
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evidence supporting its recommendation; and the state “advise the inmate 
what specific conduct is necessary for that prisoner to be reduced from Level 
5 and the amount of time it will take before [Ohio] reduce[s] the inmate’s 
security level classification.”49 Austin’s holding meant that procedural 
obstacles would pose little challenge to any state committed to solitary 
confinement for even a large fraction of its prisoners. This low impact was 
not inherent in the procedural strategy: prior to the Supreme Court’s 
intervention, the Austin litigation itself led to the release of over 80% of the 
prisoners in Ohio supermax confinement.50 But the Court’s weak version of 
procedural due process would not have compelled this result. 
The second post-Madrid strategy, the special-populations approach, 
made more difference than the first. Some prisoners, Judge Henderson had 
written, are especially vulnerable to severe damage from solitary 
confinement. For them, 
the record demonstrates . . . a particularly high risk for suffering very serious or 
severe injury to their mental health, including overt paranoia, psychotic breaks 
with reality, or massive exacerbations of existing mental illness as a result of 
the conditions in the SHU. Such inmates consist of the already mentally ill, as 
well as persons with borderline personality disorders, brain damage or mental 
retardation, impulse-ridden personalities, or a history of prior psychiatric 
problems or chronic depression. For these inmates, placing them in the SHU is 
the mental equivalent of putting an asthmatic in a place with little air to 
breathe . . . . Such inmates are not required to endure the horrific suffering of a 
serious mental illness or major exacerbation of an existing mental illness before 
obtaining relief.51 
And so, cases were filed on behalf of—especially—prisoners with 
mental illness. In several states, the result was a settlement barring at least 
prisoners with serious mental illness, especially psychosis, from solitary 
confinement.52 Such settlements could reach a significant portion of solitary 
prisoners. (As with all settlements, the details and monitoring mattered. 
Without close implementation oversight, these kinds of settlements 
 
 49 Id. at 219–20 (alterations in original) (quoting Wilkinson v. Austin, 204 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1028 
(N.D. Ohio 2012)). 
 50 E-mail from Jules Lobel, Supreme Court counsel of record, Wilkinson v. Austin, to author (Feb. 
16, 2020, 22:49 EST) (on file with journal). 
 51 Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1265–66 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
 52 See, e.g., Private Settlement Agreement at 2–3, Disability Advocates Inc. v. N.Y. State Office of 
Mental Health, No. 02-cv-4002 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2007), available at https://www.clearinghouse.net/ 
chDocs/public/PC-NY-0048-0002.pdf [https://perma.cc/5NX5-S5NQ]; Settlement Agreement at 6, 
Disability Law Ctr. v. Mass. Dep’t of Corr., No. 07-10463 (D. Mass. Dec. 12, 2011), available at 
https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-MA-0026-0004.pdf [https://perma.cc/8DFE-99GT]. 
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promoted miraculous cures of long-diagnosed psychosis; with the diagnosis 
withdrawn, the prisoner remained eligible for solitary confinement.) And as 
scientific evidence of other particular vulnerabilities mounted—for pregnant 
women, youthful prisoners, and individuals with particular physical 
disabilities, among others—new litigation began to expand exclusions to 
these populations as well.53 
In the sustained attack on solitary confinement that followed Madrid, 
prisoners and prisoners’ rights advocates partnered with sympathetic 
corrections administrators and state legislators, who undertook reviews and 
reforms that could later be assessed. Their efforts included development of 
the scientific record on the harms of solitary and of penological alternatives. 
This followed up on Judge Posner’s point in Bruscino that the Eighth 
Amendment challenge lost plausibility in the absence of some alternative to 
solitary confinement that could solve the grave security threats cited by 
correctional authorities.54 
C. The Return to Wholesale Challenges 
It was more than twenty years after Madrid that prisoner self-advocacy 
finally jolted litigation back to a more general set of challenges in two high-
profile cases: Ashker v. Brown and Peoples v. Fischer. In Ashker, two 
prisoners in California who had been confined in Pelican Bay’s SHU for 
decades, Todd Ashker and Danny Troxel, filed several pro se lawsuits 
complaining that solitary confinement conditions constituted cruel and 
unusual punishment.55 In 2011, they began what became a widespread 
hunger strike, attracting thousands of California prisoner participants.56 This 
drew the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR), a radical advocacy 
organization, to join and litigate their case. After Ashker survived a motion 
 
 53 See, e.g., Settlement Agreement at 30, Peoples v. Fischer, No. 11-cv-2964 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2016), 
available at https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-NY-0062-0015.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZA2D-8GFW] (presumption against placing pregnant prisoners in solitary, absent 
exceptional circumstances); Settlement Agreement at 5–9, H.C. v. Bradshaw, No. 9:18-cv-80810 (S.D. 
Fla. Nov. 15, 2018), available at https://clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/JC-FL-0023-0005.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JE62-JQZP] (limiting the time and use of segregated housing for prisoners under age 
eighteen); Harvard v. Inch, 411 F. Supp. 3d 1220, 1231 (N.D. Fla. 2019) (denying defendant’s motion to 
dismiss plaintiff’s claim that the prison’s use of isolation units against people with physical disabilities 
was in violation of the Eighth Amendment). 
 54 See Bruscino v. Carlson, 854 F.2d 162, 165–66 (7th Cir. 1988). For a collection of amicus briefs 
summarizing the results, see Margo Schlanger, Sheila Bedi, David Shapiro & Lynn Branham, Featured, 
Cited, and Supplemental Litigation Documents, INCARCERATION & L., 
http://incarcerationlaw.com/resources/case-documents/ [https://perma.cc/RH3W-JATD]. 
 55 Ashker v. Brown, No. 09-cv-5796, 2013 WL 1435148, at *1–2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2013). 
 56 For Ashker’s account of the events, see Summary: Todd’s Short Bio, TODD ASHKER, 
https://toddashker.org/tag/2016/ [https://perma.cc/RL7N-5HAD]. 
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to dismiss,57 CCR was able to bring the now-developed expert views against 
solitary confinement into the record—reports similar to those in Madrid but 
now informed by two decades of factual development.58 In addition, the 
plaintiffs presented new evidence supporting the claim that social isolation 
and deprivation of touch inflict significant harm.59 In 2015, the case settled, 
with terms requiring hundreds of prisoners who had been housed in solitary 
to be moved to general population—though still high-security—housing.60 
And in New York, after several incrementalist lawsuits, a handful of pro se 
prisoner complaints were consolidated to become Peoples v. Fischer, a class 
action that began what became a path to general reform.61 State-specific 
nonlitigation reform efforts have also moved from the incremental to more 
general, achieving something close to solitary confinement abolition in 
several states.62 
Table 1 presents some relevant data on the number of prisoners in 
solitary confinement for the full United States, and for Massachusetts and 
Indiana, since those are the states discussed in detail below.63 
  
 
 57 Ashker, 2013 WL 1435148, at *1. 
 58 For many of the documents filed in Ashker, see Ashker v. Governor of California, CTR. FOR CONST. 
RTS. (May 4, 2020), https://ccrjustice.org/home/what-we-do/our-cases/ashker-v-brown 
[https://perma.cc/UUD2-VBNH]. For a summary of the litigation, see Ashker v. Brown, C.R. LITIG. 
CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12103 [https://perma.cc/DWS2-Z528]. 
 59 See Expert Report of Dr. Dacher Keltner, Ph.D. at 3, Ashker v. Brown, No. 09-cv-5796 (N.D. Cal. 
Mar. 11, 2015), available at 
https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/attach/2015/07/Keltner%20Expert%20Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YW7B-QCEG] (“Human relations, health, and well-being depend critically upon the 
quality of touch an individual experiences in everyday social interactions.”); Expert Report of Matthew 
D. Lieberman at 4, Ashker v. Brown, No. 09-cv-5796 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2015), available at 
https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/attach/2015/07/Lieberman%20Expert%20Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/24E5-SY7B] (“[A] lack of social connection and social support have been examined as 
risk factors for morbidity (i.e. death) . . . . [and] has also been repeatedly associated with various 
deleterious mental and physical health consequences . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
 60 Settlement Agreement, Ashker v. Brown, No. 09-cv-5796 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2015), available at 
https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-CA-0054-0024.pdf [https://perma.cc/6P2F-HFYV]. 
 61 See Peoples v. Fischer, C.R. LITIG. CLEARINGHOUSE, 
https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12210 [https://perma.cc/G3LY-VNCB]; Interview with 
Phillip Desgranges & Alex Reiter, supra note 5. 
 62 For essays by heads of corrections about their reform efforts in Colorado, Idaho, North Dakota, 
and Ohio, see THE ASS’N OF STATE CORR. ADM’RS & THE LIMAN CTR. FOR PUB. INTEREST LAW AT 
YALE LAW SCH., WORKING TO LIMIT RESTRICTIVE HOUSING: EFFORTS IN FOUR JURISDICTIONS TO 
MAKE CHANGES (2018), 
https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/area/center/liman/document/asca_liman_2018_restrictive_housin
g_efforts_in_four_jurisdictions_to_make_changes.pdf [https://perma.cc/6AGR-ZWDD]. 
 63 For a full panel of state-by-state data, see this Essay’s online appendix, available at 
http://www.law.umich.edu/facultyhome/margoschlanger/Pages/Publications.aspx [https://perma.cc/FN3
J-UNEP]. 
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TABLE 1: PRISON SOLITARY CONFINEMENT BY STATE64 
 *Survey responders only.65 
 
 64 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, ICPSR 24642, CENSUS OF STATE AND 
FEDERAL ADULT CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES, 2005 (2017) 
https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/24642 [https://perma.cc/V6ZH-AGMQ]; U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, ICPSR 4021, CENSUS OF STATE AND FEDERAL 
ADULT CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES, 2000 (2004), 
https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/4021 [https://perma.cc/G837-JYEA]; U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, ICPSR 6953, CENSUS OF STATE AND FEDERAL ADULT 
CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES, 1995 (1998), https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/6953 
[https://perma.cc/J4TS-87DX]; THE ASS’N OF STATE CORR. ADM’RS & THE LIMAN CTR. FOR PUB. 
INTEREST LAW AT YALE LAW SCH., REFORMING RESTRICTIVE HOUSING: THE 2018 ASCA-LIMAN 
NATIONWIDE SURVEY OF TIME-IN-CELL 12–13 (2018), 
https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/area/center/liman/document/asca_liman_2018_restrictive_housin
g_released_oct_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/2U7L-HTWN] [hereinafter ASCA & LIMAN, 2018]; ASS’N 
OF STATE CORR. ADM’RS & THE LIMAN PROGRAM, YALE LAW SCH., TIME-IN-CELL: THE ASCA-LIMAN 
2014 NATIONAL SURVEY OF ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION IN PRISON 15 (2015), 
https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/area/center/liman/document/time-in-cell_combined_-
web_august_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/JY3G-YPG9] [hereinafter ASCA & LIMAN, 2015]; MASS. DEP’T 
OF CORR., MONTHLY RESTRICTIVE HOUSING REPORT (2020), https://www.mass.gov/doc/restrictive-
housing-report-march-2020/download [https://perma.cc/9RJK-KPC7]; MASS. DEP’T OF CORR., WEEKLY 
COUNT SHEET 1 (Mar. 2, 2020), https://www.mass.gov/doc/weekly-inmate-count-322020/download 
[https://perma.cc/C5PC-77XN]. Note that Table 1 should be read as suggestive only—in particular, there 
is reason to think that the Bureau of Justice Statistics results from 1995 to 2005 do not measure precisely 
the same thing as the ASCA–Liman results from 2014 to 2017. Total U.S. prison population in 2017 is 
from JENNIFER BRONSON & E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 252156, PRISONERS 
IN 2017 (2019), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p17.pdf [https://perma.cc/55E2-ZUTJ]. 
 65 For the 2014 results, survey responders include thirty-four jurisdictions, housing about 73% of the 
Source Year Total Prison Population 
Solitary Confinement 





1990 12,338 602 4.9% 
1995 14,044 697 5.0% 
2000 18,195 1,348 7.4% 




2014 28,318 1,789 6.3% 
2015 27,508 1,621 5.9% 





1990 7,870 417 5.3% 
1995 10,579 515 4.9% 
2000 10,500 542 5.2% 




2014 10,475 518 5.5% 
2015 10,004 235 2.3% 
2017 9,047 443 4.9% 
MDOC 2020 7,941 299 3.8% 




1990 690,771 36,254 5.2% 
1995 990,617 47,945 4.8% 
2000 1,305,253 70,085 5.4% 




2014* 1,049,984 66,495 6.3% 
2015* 1,124,695 56,337 5.0% 
2017* 1,055,196 46,893 4.4% 
2017 (est.) 1,490,000 61,000 4.1% 
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Table 1 presents data from two different series of publications (labeled 
by source in its first column). Data should be compared only within source 
type; the apparent increase in solitary from 2005 to 2014 may be a function 
of methodological differences, rather than reflecting a true increase. Even 
conservatively interpreted, however, it demonstrates that a long path remains 
to solitary confinement abolition. On any given day, U.S. prisons house over 
60,000 people in solitary confinement.66 And so the question remains: are 
incrementalist strategies helpful or harmful to the abolitionist goal? 
II. TWO STATE CASE STUDIES 
I have picked two states, Massachusetts and Indiana, as sites for a 
deeper dive into the pathways of solitary reform. This is a compare-and-
contrast exercise: the two states are similar in some ways and different in 
others. In both, incrementalist strategies dominated for several decades. But 
more recently, Massachusetts seems to be heading towards more general and 
deeper reductions in solitary populations, while Indiana does not. Between 
the two, it is possible to examine most of the current reform approaches. 
A. Massachusetts 
Solitary reform came early to Massachusetts in 1985, when prisoners at 
the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Cedar Junction mailed a letter 
to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court describing dangerous 
conditions in the Disciplinary Segregation Unit (DSU).67 Justice Paul Liacos 
treated the letter as a court complaint, asked Massachusetts Correctional 
Legal Services to represent the prisoners, and took original jurisdiction over 
the matter.68 The resulting litigation, Hoffer v. Fair,69 challenged the 
procedures by which prisoners were placed and held in administrative 
segregation under Massachusetts’s constitution, state statutes, and 
regulations, as well as privileges and programming. The plaintiffs won and 
 
American prison population. ASCA & LIMAN, 2015, supra note 64, at 2. The 2015 and 2017 results are 
for forty jurisdictions. ASCA & LIMAN, 2018, supra note 64, at 96 tbl.21. 
 66 See id. at 4. There are no reliable estimates for jails, but if the solitary rate is similar in jail and 
prison, that would add another 33,000 to the count. 
 67 The Supreme Judicial Court had rejected a challenge to conditions at the unit just a few years prior 
in Libby v. Commissioner of Correction, 432 N.E.2d 486 (Mass. 1982). 
 68 See Hoffer v. Comm’r of Corr., 490 N.E.2d 417, 418–19 (Mass. 1986); E-mail from James 
Pingeon, Litig. Dir., Prisoners’ Legal Servs. of Mass., to author (Oct. 28, 2019, 13:55 EST) (on file with 
journal). 
 69 For a description of the litigation, see Hoffer v. Fair, C.R. LITIG. CLEARINGHOUSE, 
https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=10038 [https://perma.cc/J4EQ-2LJQ]. 
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Justice Liacos ordered significant changes to the regulations that governed 
the unit.70 
For prisoners who ended up in the DSU, the intervention was limited; 
even after the reforms, DSU prisoners spent twenty-three hours per day in 
their cells (though the regulations did improve their access to reading 
material and visitation and required individualized justification for 
programming restrictions). The more important limit was on who could be 
sent to the unit and for how long. The regulatory changes were primarily 
intended “to ensure that residents will not be unnecessarily or arbitrarily 
retained in the DSU.”71 The regulations, currently still in effect, have 
provided for a hearing before an impartial board, which can impose solitary 
confinement only based on “substantial evidence” that the prisoner poses a 
“substantial threat” to the safety of himself, others, or the operation of the 
facility.72 Perhaps more significantly, in practice, the regulations have 
required solitary confinement to be conditional. That is, the state has had to 
set conditions with which compliance would lead to release from solitary in 
six months. These conditions could include, for example, “successful 
participation in specified counseling or evaluation programs, [the] 
completion of work assignments, remaining free of disciplinary reports, 
cooperation with correctional personnel, and maintenance of cell and 
sanitation standards.”73 
Decades of litigation flowed from these regulations. In 1995, the state 
attempted to repeal the regulations, but that effort was enjoined.74 Then, in 
the early 2000s, as procedural due process challenges made only limited 
headway under federal law,75 Massachusetts prisoners’ rights advocates 
sought—eventually successfully—to have the regulations applied more 
broadly to other prisons and to similar, though not identical, solitary 
 
 70 Hoffer v. Fair, No. 85-71, slip op. at 39–51 (Mass. Mar. 3, 1988), available at 
https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-MA-0029-0003.pdf [https://perma.cc/67F8-JV5X]. 
The modified DSU regulations issued in response to that decision were codified at 103 MASS. CODE 
REGS. 421.00, 421.20(2)(c), 421.20(7) (since modified). 
 71 Hoffer v. Comm’r of Corr., 589 N.E.2d 1231, 1234 (Mass. 1992). 
 72 103 MASS. CODE REGS. 421.09, 421.12 (2020). 
 73 103 MASS. CODE REGS. 421.15 (2020). 
 74 See Post Final Judgment Order, Hoffer v. Fair, No. SJ-1985-0071 (Mass. Sept. 26, 1995), available 
at https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-MA-0029-9000.pdf [https://perma.cc/S8M6-
SKST]. 
 75 See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 230 (2005); Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 487 (1995); 
supra notes 47–50 and accompanying text. 
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confinement settings.76 This led to the shutdown of several such units.77 
However, in the meantime, the Department of Correction (DOC) has 
managed to reduce the regulations’ impact by reconfiguring its solitary 
system, substituting long-term disciplinary segregation for much of the 
confinement previously accomplished by administrative segregation.78 That 
change wiped out the impact of the 1980s reforms; Massachusetts 
disciplinary rules imposed solitary confinement as a sanction for in-prison 
misconduct for up to ten years per offense.79 And a litigated challenge to 
solitary imposed as a disciplinary sanction failed completely.80 
A different incrementalist lawsuit was filed in 2007 by a consortium of 
Massachusetts lawyers: Massachusetts Correctional Legal Services 
(renamed Prisoners Legal Services of Massachusetts during the lawsuit’s 
pendency); the Center for Public Representation, a disability rights 
organization; the Disability Law Center (DLC), which served as both lawyer 
and organizational plaintiff; and a large white-shoe law firm, Bingham 
McCutchen. The case, Disability Law Center v. Massachusetts Department 
of Correction,81 focused on prisoners with mental illnesses, alleging 
violations of the Constitution and the Americans with Disabilities Act: 
By placing prisoners with mental illnesses in segregated confinement, the 
Massachusetts Department of Correction subjects these vulnerable individuals 
to conditions they are physically and psychologically incapable of tolerating for 
any sustained period of time. The extreme social isolation and sensory 
deprivation conditions of segregated confinement are difficult for all prisoners; 
 
 76 See Cantell v. Comm’r of Corr., 60 N.E.3d 1149, 1151 (Mass. 2016) (described at Cantell v. 
Commissioner of Correction et al., C.R. LITIG. CLEARINGHOUSE, 
https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17279 [https://perma.cc/QPD9-PJKT]) (applying DSU 
regulations to other units in which conditions “are also at least as restrictive as those applied to [DSUs]”); 
LaChance v. Comm’r of Corr., 978 N.E.2d 1199, 1205 (Mass. 2012) (described at LaChance v. 
Commissioner, C.R. LITIG. CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17282 
[https://perma.cc/T4VX-RSND]) (finding that “under DOC regulations, indefinite confinement in any 
unit where conditions are substantially similar to those of a DSU entitles an inmate to the protections 
afforded by the DSU regulations”); Haverty v. Comm’r of Corr., 776 N.E.2d 973, 991 (Mass. 2002) 
(described at Haverty v. Commissioner of Correction, C.R. LITIG. CLEARINGHOUSE, 
https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=10037 [https://perma.cc/Q9AX-PEP7]) (finding non-DSU 
segregation units to be so similar to those of the DSU that state regulations apply). 
 77 E-mail from James R. Pingeon, Litig. Dir., Prisoners’ Legal Servs. of Mass., to author (Mar. 31, 
2020, 13:32 EST) (on file with journal). 
 78 Id.; see also E-mail from James R. Pingeon, supra note 68. 
 79 103 MASS. CODE REGS. 430.25(1)(f) (2020); see also E-mail from James R. Pingeon, supra note 
68. 
 80 Torres v. Comm’r of Corr., 695 N.E.2d 200, 206 (Mass. 1998). 
 81 No. 1:07-cv-10463-MLW (D. Mass.). For a case description, see Disability Law Center v. 
Massachusetts Department of Correction, C.R. LITIG. CLEARINGHOUSE, 
https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=9481 [https://perma.cc/42Y9-3R9K]. 
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for prisoners with mental illnesses, they exceed the limit of human endurance. 
Indeed, it is only too common for prisoners with mental illnesses to suffer 
further psychological deterioration, inflict serious harm to themselves, and even 
commit suicide as a result of placement in segregation.82 
Five years of litigation resulted in a settlement agreement largely 
excluding prisoners with serious mental illness from both disciplinary and 
administrative segregation. Instead, such prisoners were to be housed, if 
possible, in a “Secure Treatment Unit,” designed to be more therapeutic. 
There were two types of such units: “Secure Treatment Program” units for 
prisoners with Axis I (that is, psychosis and mood disorder) diagnoses and 
“Behavioral Management Units” for those with Axis II (personality disorder) 
diagnoses.83 While waiting for this assignment, covered prisoners were to be 
provided more out-of-cell time and slightly more privileges.84 The settlement 
implementation period was three years, and the case was dismissed in 2015.85 
Observers report that the Secure Treatment Program (STP) units are notably 
different from pre-reform solitary confinement, with a much more 
therapeutic environment, but that the Behavioral Management Units (BMUs) 
remain highly punitive. A DOC presentation slide86 from early in the new 
regime confirms the point. Titled “Different Issues = Different 
Interventions,” it contrasts the two types of units: 
 
Mentally Ill Antisocial/Psychopathic 
o Medication 
o Supportive Therapy 
o Insight into mental illness 
o Relationships with staff and 
other offenders are important 
o Behavior Management 
o Clearly defined incentives and 
consequences 
o Strict adherence to rules 
o All staff must be consistent 
 
 
 82 Complaint at 1, Disability Law Ctr. v. Mass. Dep’t of Corr., No. 1:07-cv-10463-MLW (D. Mass. 
Mar. 8, 2017), available at https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-MA-0026-0001.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BM9X-269T]. 
 83 Presentation, Katherine L. O’Neill, Dir. of Behavioral Health, Specialized Mental Health Units: 
Massachusetts Department of Correction (no date but covers period through 2011) (on file with journal). 
 84 Settlement Agreement at 3–7, Disability Law Ctr. v. Mass. Dep’t of Corr., No. 1:07-cv-10463-
MLW (D. Mass. Dec. 12, 2011), available at https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-MA-
0026-0004.pdf [https://perma.cc/GS5E-Z99P]. 
 85 Stipulation of Dismissal at 1, Disability Law Ctr. v. Mass. Dep’t of Corr., No. 1:07-cv-10463-
MLW (D. Mass. May 20, 2015), available at https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-MA-
0026-0009.pdf [https://perma.cc/8QTL-SGBA]. 
 86 O’Neill, supra note 83. 
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A 2012 report by plaintiffs’ expert Dr. Kathryn Burns demonstrates that the 
BMUs were experienced by prisoners to be no less punitive than 
presettlement solitary. Dr. Burns reported a high “degree of anger, hostility 
and frustration expressed by the inmates,” who complained that BMU 
programming was “punitive rather than therapeutic,” and reported overuse 
of “accountability cells”—a cell assignment attached to “loss of 
level/privileges and property; removal of clothing and undergarments with 
issue of safety smock; no soap or toothpaste; no access to shower; and all 
meals are finger foods.”87 Bob Fleischner, plaintiffs’ counsel in Disability 
Law Center and also a member of a current oversight committee, reports 
more recently that prisoners with serious mental illness describe the STP 
units as “life saving.” Fleischner says he has observed a sharp shift in 
attitude, as staff have come around to the view that prisoners with serious 
mental illness do not belong in solitary. By contrast, he sees the Behavioral 
Management Units as highly punitive, and reports that the prisoners housed 
there are extremely unhappy.88 
In addition, prisoners’ rights lawyer Jim Pingeon reports that the DLC 
case improved the environment for those prisoners left in solitary. The 
disciplinary units, he says,  
became notably calmer and less chaotic with the removal of prisoners with SMI. 
Before, when I’d go onto the unit there were almost always people screaming; 
it was often filled with smoke from prisoners lighting fires, and the smell of 
feces from prisoners throwing it out of their cells or smearing it in the showers 
was often in the air. The difference post DLC-suit was palpable and even guards 
expressed appreciation.89 
Thus, as of 2015, incremental solitary confinement reform in 
Massachusetts had produced moderate payoffs: hard-won procedural 
requirements for administrative segregation covered only a portion of the 
prisoners facing solitary confinement and had even provoked the backlash 
of long-term disciplinary segregation. And true alternatives to solitary were 
being implemented for just a small portion of the affected population. 
Conditions in solitary were a bit improved. 
But in the years since, it has seemed that both the procedural and 
substantive steps just described are providing a crucial blueprint for much 
more thoroughgoing reforms. First, as the Disability Law Center case drew 
 
 87 First Report of Designated Expert Kathryn A. Burns, MD, MPH at 4, Disability Law Ctr. v. Mass. 
Dep’t of Corr., No. 1:07-cv-10463-MLW (Oct. 22, 2012), available at 
https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-MA-0026-0016.pdf [https://perma.cc/7UKS-EC3U]. 
 88 Telephone Interview with Robert Fleischner, supra note 5. 
 89 E-mail from James R. Pingeon, supra note 68. 
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to its close in 2015, the legislature passed a statute largely codifying the 
settlement, rendering it permanent.90 The statute provided: 
Except in exigent circumstances that would create an unacceptable risk to the 
safety of any person or where no secure treatment unit bed is available, a 
segregated inmate diagnosed with a serious mental illness in accordance with 
clinical standards adopted by the department of correction shall not be housed 
in a segregated unit for more than 30 days and shall be placed in a secure 
treatment unit. Any such segregated inmate awaiting transfer to a secure 
treatment unit shall be offered additional mental health services in accordance 
with clinical standards adopted by the department.91 
Next, in 2018, much more thorough reform began. Solitary confinement 
reform was made a small part of a comprehensive criminal justice reform 
effort, signed by the Governor in April and effective December 31, 2018.92 
The new statute’s reach is far broader than any of the prior interventions, 
though it used them as a model. Massachusetts criminal justice reform had a 
broad constituency—activists of many stripes exerted political pressure, and 
legislative leaders and their allies worked on the issue in state government, 
pressuring a reluctant governor.93 
First, building on the Disability Law Center reforms, the new statute 
expanded the definition of “serious mental illness” to include: 
(i) schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders; (ii) major depressive disorders; 
(iii) all types of bipolar disorders; (iv) a neurodevelopmental disorder, dementia 
or other cognitive disorder; (v) any disorder commonly characterized by breaks 
with reality or perceptions of reality; (vi) all types of anxiety disorders; (vii) 
trauma and stressor related disorders; or (viii) severe personality disorders; or a 
finding by a qualified mental health professional that the prisoner is at serious 
risk of substantially deteriorating mentally or emotionally while confined in 
restrictive housing, or already has so deteriorated while confined in restrictive 
housing, such that diversion or removal is deemed to be clinically appropriate 
by a qualified mental health professional.94 
 
 90 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 127, §§ 1, 39, 39A (2015) (all now amended). 
 91 Id. § 39A(b) (effective Apr. 5, 2015 to Dec. 30, 2018). 
 92 S. 2371, 189th Gen. Court. §§ 85–86 (Mass. 2018) (amending MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 127, § 1 by 
adding a new definition of restrictive housing and expanding the definition of SMI); id. § 93 (amending 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 127, § 39 by striking § 39 and § 39A and adding new sections). 
 93 See Matt Murphy, Negotiators File Compromise Criminal Justice Reform Bill, METROWEST 
DAILY NEWS (Mar. 26, 2018, 2:24 PM), 
https://www.metrowestdailynews.com/news/20180323/negotiators-file-compromise-criminal-justice-
reform-bill [perma.cc/8LGV-YAA4]. 
 94 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 127, § 1 (2020). 
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This definition covers many more people than the lawsuit settlement. And 
the new statute imposes a more muscular ban on solitary confinement of this 
larger group. It bars prisoners with serious mental illness, so defined, from 
restrictive housing absent certification provided to the prisoner explaining  
(i) the reason why the prisoner may not be safely held in the general population; 
(ii) that there is no available placement in a secure treatment unit; (iii) that 
efforts are being undertaken to find appropriate housing and the status of the 
efforts; and (iv) the anticipated time frame for resolution.95 
In addition, the new statute goes further in the special-populations 
direction in several ways. It applies to jails as well as prisons.96 The results 
have been mixed. As James Pingeon reports, “Some [jails] have responded 
by increasing out-of-cell time to a bit more than two hours so the[] law won’t 
apply, but others have made pretty significant strides in reducing the solitary 
population and creating alternative treatment units.”97 It imposes a flat ban 
on housing pregnant prisoners in restrictive housing.98 And it requires that 
“[t]he fact that a prisoner is lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer or 
intersex or has a gender identity or expression or sexual orientation 
uncommon in general population shall not be grounds for placement in 
restrictive housing.”99 
The rest of the new statute covers everyone in solitary confinement, not 
just special populations. Besides softening the conditions in solitary in a 
variety of ways, it allows isolation of prisoners only if they “pose[] an 
unacceptable risk: (i) to the safety of others; (ii) of damage or destruction of 
property; or (iii) to the operation of a correctional facility,”100 and it enforces 
that requirement via “placement reviews.”101 The effect is to eliminate long-
fixed-term solitary confinement as a disciplinary sanction. It also sets up 
oversight mechanisms, including a “restrictive housing oversight 
committee,” which includes DOC personnel, other law enforcement, and 
outsiders connected to the two litigation efforts described above or otherwise 
likely to have a more prisoner-friendly orientation (“the executive director 
of Disability Law Center, Inc. or a designee, . . . the executive director of 
Prisoners’ Legal Services or a designee, . . . the executive director of the 
 
 95 Id. § 39A(a). 
 96 Id. § 39(a) (governing “the superintendent of a state correctional facility or the administrator of a 
county correctional facility”). 
 97 E-mail from James R. Pingeon, supra note 68. 
 98 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 127, § 39A(d) (2020). 
 99 Id. § 39A(c). 
 100 Id. § 39(a). 
 101 Id. § 39B(a). 
115:273 (2020)  Incrementalist vs. Maximalist Reform 
297 
Massachusetts Association for Mental Health, Inc. or a designee and . . . a 
licensed social worker designated by the Massachusetts chapter of the 
National Association of Social Workers, Inc.”).102 Thus, to quote James 
Pingeon, incrementalist litigation has “to some extent . . . work[ed] in 
harmony” with closer-to-abolitionist legislation.103 The litigation put 
“pressure . . . on the governor,” leading to progress via political rather than 
court-centered routes.104 
Implementation of this set of reforms is, however, hotly contested. Even 
though he had signed the new statute, Governor Charlie Baker soon proposed 
to dial back the definition of serious mental illness.105 Although his proposal 
died with the legislative session in which it was introduced, it was revived 
the following session and is currently pending.106 Meanwhile, the state first 
delayed the designation of the oversight committee,107 then promulgated a 
temporary regulation that banned committee members’ communication to 
the public or the press (absent approval of the chair); limited information-
gathering to existing documents and data; and barred unannounced visits to 
prisons and all access to nonpublic data (such as prisoner files) without a 
signed prisoner release.108 In August 2019, the final regulation backed off on 
what the press had labeled a “gag rule” but maintained the other limits.109 
The Department of Correction also implemented new “Secure Adjustment 
Units” that, while locking prisoners down in single cells for nearly all of each 
day, allow them sufficient out-of-cell hours per day to escape classification 
 
 102 Id. § 39G(a). 
 103 Telephone Interview with James Pingeon, supra note 5. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Letter from Charles D. Baker, Governor of Mass., to the Mass. Senate & House of 
Representatives (Apr. 13, 2018), 
https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2018/04/13/CJ%20Supplement%20Filing%20Letter.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4CGP-LK3Q] (“[T]he Act’s definition of serious mental illness is so broad that it 
includes any inmate with an anxiety disorder, no matter how well managed with medication, and trauma 
and stressor related disorders. The enclosed bill includes a more narrow definition of ‘serious mental 
illness’ that, when appropriate, incorporates the concept of significant functional impairment.”). 
 106 See An Act Clarifying the Definition of Serious Mental Illness on Criminal Justice Reform, H. 
1571, 191st Gen. Court (Mass. 2019) (pending); An Act Building on Criminal Justice Reform, H. 4426, 
190th Gen. Court (Mass. 2018). 
 107 See Telephone Interview with Robert Fleischner, supra note 5. 
 108 See 103 MASS. CODE REGS. 179.00 (2019).  
 109 Compare id., with PRISONERS’ LEGAL SERVS. OF MASS., TESTIMONY OF DESIGNEES TO THE 
RESTRICTIVE HOUSING OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE ON THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS’ PROPOSED 
REGULATIONS 103 CMR 179 REGARDING THE RESTRICTIVE HOUSING OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE (2019), 
https://www.mamh.org/assets/files/RHOC-Testimony-re-Regs.docx [https://perma.cc/W72P-JQ8U] 
(testimony of Marlene Sallo, on behalf of the Disability Law Center; Robert Fleischner, on behalf of the 
Massachusetts Association for Mental Health; and Bonita Tenneriello, on behalf of Prisoners’ Legal 
Services of Massachusetts; National Association of Social Workers, Massachusetts Chapter). 
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as solitary confinement under the new statute.110 In response, reformers have 
introduced tighter statutory language, which is under consideration in the 
state legislature.111  
There is no way to know where all this will land—it is clear that the 
Governor and Department of Correction are resisting reform, but unclear 
who will finally win the tug-of-war. Currently (prior to COVID-19 issues), 
the monthly population in solitary confinement in Massachusetts prisons has 
declined, but certainly not to zero. In the first month for which data were 
collected under the new statute, the solitary confinement population was 
392—5.1% of total population. In no month since then has it exceeded 343 
people, and it has averaged 316 people and 4.2% of total population.112 
B. Indiana 
In Indiana, as in Massachusetts and other states, solitary confinement 
has been used for many decades, and prisoners have consistently objected to 
both their assignment to solitary and its conditions. For example, a class 
action injunction that regulated conditions of confinement at the Indiana 
Reformatory from the 1980s through 2002 included both procedural and 
substantive constraints on the use of solitary.113 As other states and the federal 
government embraced supermax confinement, so too did Indiana, opening 
its first supermax in 1991 and its second in 1993.114 Prisoners immediately 
protested harsh conditions; of the thirty-five prisoners housed in the 
supermax in late 1991, at least sixteen conducted a long hunger strike, which 
ended only when the state obtained a force-feeding court order. Several 
 
 110 See 103 MASS. CODE REGS. 430.05 (2019); Katie Rose Quandt, Massachusetts Department of 
Correction Gives a Lesson in How to Get Around Solitary Confinement Reforms, SOLITARY WATCH 
(Nov. 20, 2019), https://solitarywatch.org/2019/11/20/massachusetts-department-of-correction-gives-a-
lesson-in-how-to-get-around-solitary-confinement-reforms/ [https://perma.cc/EV58-9JP3]. 
 111 An Act to Provide Criminal Justice Reform Protections to All Prisoners in Segregated 
Confinement, S. 2413, 191st Gen. Court (Mass. 2019) (introduced Aug. 12, 2019). 
 112 For the weekly overall population, see Weekly Inmate Count 2020, MASS.GOV, 
https://www.mass.gov/lists/weekly-inmate-count-2020 [https://perma.cc/NAM8-XJN8]; Weekly Inmate 
Count 2019, MASS.GOV, https://www.mass.gov/lists/weekly-inmate-count-2019 
[https://perma.cc/YG3W-3EMD]. For the monthly solitary confinement population, see Weekly 
Restrictive Housing Counts, MASS.GOV, https://www.mass.gov/lists/monthly-restrictive-housing-counts 
[https://perma.cc/YFY7-VB4Q]. I post a longitudinal spreadsheet with month-by-month data at this 
Essay’s technical appendix, available at 
http://www.law.umich.edu/facultyhome/margoschlanger/Pages/Publications.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/FN3J-UNEP]. 
 113 French v. Miller, C.R. LITIG. CLEARINGHOUSE, https://clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=703 
[https://perma.cc/5TR5-LWAG]. 
 114 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, COLD STORAGE: SUPER-MAXIMUM SECURITY CONFINEMENT IN 
INDIANA (1997), https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1997/usind/ [https://perma.cc/N7DS-EWZZ] 
[hereinafter COLD STORAGE]. 
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months later, seeking to enlist outside support, a prisoner in the supermax 
cut off one of his fingertips to send to the ACLU as a cry for help.115 The 
prisoners were unable to gain much political traction, although there was one 
well-attended protest of solitary confinement conditions.116 Prisoners also 
filed over a dozen lawsuits, pro se, in federal district court. The class action 
litigation that followed, Taifa v. Bayh,117 began in 1992 (first in state court, 
then quickly removed to federal court). With the ACLU of Indiana serving 
as class counsel, Taifa consolidated many of the pro se cases before Chief 
Judge Allen Sharp, a Nixon appointee. The case was limited to just one 
supermax—the “Maximum Control Complex” (MCC), part of Indiana’s 
Westville prison. Its attack was comprehensive—as summarized upon 
settlement by the magistrate judge, it alleged that long-term solitary 
confinement at the MCC “subjects [the plaintiff class to] sensory deprivation 
and arbitrary and irrational rules, physically abuses them, denies them 
visitation and medical and psychiatric care, and deprives them of 
educational, vocational, recreational, and other rehabilitative programs,” in 
violation of the Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment.118 Among 
the allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement were  
denial of telephone privileges and use of radios and televisions; arbitrary 
discipline; the removal of bedding as punishment for minor infractions; 
extremely cold temperatures within the facility; restrictions on visitation; 
limited out-of-cell time; constantly illuminated cells; prohibiting the display of 
personal items; denial of vocational, educational and rehabilitative 
opportunities; denial of meaningful recreation and exercise time; contaminated 
drinking water; restricted access to the courts and inadequate law library; 
tampering with prisoner mail; confiscation of religious materials; restrictions 
on taking Bible study correspondence courses; unavailability of commissary 
items; verbal harassment; physical abuse; and denial of adequate medical and 
mental health care.119 
The settlement was equally comprehensive. Again, as summarized by 
the magistrate judge: 
In general, the Agreed Entry would provide for: the assignment of prisoners to 
the MCC only under specified conditions; the transfer of prisoners out of the 
 
 115 Id.; see also Aaron Isby-Israel, Indiana Prisoners Must Unite & Struggle to Change Conditions!, 
IDOC WATCH (Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.idocwatch.org/blog-1/israel-indiana-prisoners-must-unite-
and-struggle [https://perma.cc/X85A-ERMT]. 
 116 See NANCY KURSHAN, OUT OF CONTROL: A FIFTEEN YEAR BATTLE AGAINST CONTROL UNIT 
PRISONS 151–53 (2013). 
 117 See Taifa v. Bayh, C.R. LITIG. CLEARINGHOUSE, 
https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=706 [https://perma.cc/2LEM-FE9V]. 
 118 Taifa v. Bayh, 846 F. Supp. 723, 724 (N.D. Ind. 1994). 
 119 Id. at 725. 
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MCC after a specified period of time, provided that certain conditions are met; 
a commissary at the MCC, with a list of particular items to be made available; 
inmate access to radios and televisions under specified conditions and at inmate 
expense; expanded visitation and telephone privileges; the availability of 
additional reading materials for prisoners; increased opportunities for prisoner 
recreation; increased privileges with respect to keeping of personal property in 
cells and in the storage room; improvements in the condition of bedding; a 
decrease in the intensity of the 24-hour lights in the cells; additional access by 
prisoners to personal hygienic items; the establishment of a policy concerning 
the use of force by DOC personnel; expanded provisions for medical care, 
including mandatory psychiatric evaluations for all prisoners upon their 
admittance to the MCC; an expanded law library containing specified reference 
materials, and provisions for greater access to legal materials by prisoners; 
increased educational opportunities for prisoners; a substance abuse program; 
and improvements in inmate grievance procedures.120 
As the quotation makes clear, Taifa was mostly a conditions case. But 
its settlement did have significant terms governing who could be assigned to 
the MCC—only prisoners with a documented history, during the current 
term of incarceration, of “[e]scapes with attempts to cause physical harm to 
staff, other prisoners, and/or the public at large, or to cause serious 
destruction to the physical plant”; “[a]ssaultive behavior against staff and/or 
prisoners causing serious bodily injury and/or death”; “[r]ioting or inciting 
to riot or violence causing the serious disruption of the orderly management 
of a facility or unit”; “[i]ntensive involvement in violent gang activities”; or 
“[a]ggressive sexual conduct and/or rape.”121 Moreover, the settlement 
provided that “[p]risoners diagnosed as mentally ill shall not be incarcerated 
in MCC.”122 Nonetheless, the State’s settlement-mandated retrospective 
review of all the MCC prisoners yielded few, if any, releases.123 And the 
settlement did not control assignments to Indiana’s other supermax or to 
solitary confinement in any other state prison. In addition, in late 1996, the 
settlement was modified to allow use of the facility for long-term 
 
 120 Id. at 726. 
 121 Agreed Entry at 2, Taifa v. Bayh, 846 F. Supp. 723 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 31, 1994) (No. S-92-00429-
M), available at https://clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-IN-0006-0002.pdf [https://perma.cc/UJ2W-
DXM2]. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Taifa v. Bayh, No. 3:92cv429AS, 1995 WL 803816, at *4 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 26, 1995) (describing 
a review in which line-level staff flagged about twenty-six prisoners for further consideration, but a 
“classification analyst” concluded that there were “maybe two offenders that didn’t meet particular 
criteria,” of whom at least one was then deemed appropriately assigned). The district court disposition of 
this issue was reversed on appeal, but the ultimate outcome is unclear. See Komyatti v. Bayh, 96 F.3d 
955, 964 (7th Cir. 1996). 
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disciplinary segregation, even if the classification criteria listed above were 
not met.124 
The Taifa settlement induced the State to allow Human Rights Watch 
full investigative access to Indiana’s two supermaxes. The resulting report, 
Cold Storage,125 became an important document in nationwide advocacy. 
The Taifa settlement lasted nearly a decade before it was terminated in 
2003,126 but it did not reduce the use of solitary confinement. Indeed, as 
settlement implementation began, the number of Indiana prisoners in solitary 
confinement rose.127 
Just two years after the termination of the Taifa settlement, in 2005, the 
ACLU of Indiana filed another anti-solitary federal court class action. Mast 
v. Donohue128 focused on Indiana’s second supermax facility, the Secured 
Housing Unit at Wabash Valley Correctional Facility. The resulting 
settlement required that prisoners with serious mental illness (defined as 
Axis I disorders—that is, psychosis and mood disorders—or a “mental 
disorder that is worsened by confinement in the SHU”) not be housed at 
Wabash Valley.129 Instead, such prisoners were to receive necessary 
psychiatric services at other, less anti-therapeutic institutions or in general 
population units.130 In implementation, however, plaintiffs’ counsel, ACLU 
lawyer Kenneth Falk, observed that the result was simply shifting those same 
prisoners to less regulated facilities, where they continued to violate prison 
rules as a result of their mental illness and to receive decades of disciplinary 
solitary confinement as a result.131 
Indiana’s third large solitary confinement litigation, filed in 2008, 
attempted to address this issue. In Indiana Protection and Advocacy Services 
Commission v. Commissioner, Indiana Department of Correction (IPAS),132 
 
 124 COLD STORAGE, supra note 114, at 18. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Taifa v. Bayh, C.R. LITIG. CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=706 
[https://perma.cc/TAG3-LV58]. 
 127 See supra Table 1. 
 128 See Mast v. Indiana Department of Corrections, C.R. LITIG. CLEARINGHOUSE, 
https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=5554 [https://perma.cc/JAZ6-G5S5] (describing factual 
background). 
 129 Private Settlement Agreement at 3, Mast v. Donahue, No. 2:05-cv-00037 LJM/WGH (S.D. Ind. 
Jan. 1, 2007), available at https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-IN-0013-0002.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4GYX-VZFG]. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Telephone Interview with Kenneth Falk, supra note 5. 
 132 No. 1:08-cv-01317-TWP-MJD, 2012 WL 6738517, at *1–2 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 31, 2012). For a case 
description, see Indiana Protection and Advocacy Services (IPAS) Commission v. Commissioner, Indiana 
Department of Correction, C.R. LITIG. CLEARINGHOUSE, 
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the ACLU of Indiana represented Indiana’s Protection and Advocacy agency 
and the class of prisoners with mental illness housed in “settings . . . that 
feature extended periods of time in cells, including, but not limited to, 
prisoners in disciplinary segregation, administrative segregation, or in the 
New Castle Psychiatric Unit.”133 This time, the State declined to settle; 
plaintiffs won a five-day bench trial in 2011, and the district court entered a 
finding that prisoners with mental illness in solitary confinement were 
receiving constitutionally inadequate mental health care.134 
The parties entered into remedial negotiations and, in 2016, jointly 
submitted a proposed agreement that generally prohibited solitary 
confinement of seriously mentally ill prisoners.135 The definition of seriously 
mentally ill prisoners was more precise than in Mast: 
a. Prisoners determined to have a current diagnosis or recent significant history 
of schizophrenia, delusional disorder, schizophreniform disorder, 
schizoaffective disorder, brief psychotic disorder, substance-induced psychotic 
disorder (excluding intoxication and withdrawal), undifferentiated psychotic 
disorder, bipolar I or II disorders; 
b. Prisoners diagnosed with any other validated mental illness that is clinically 
severe, based on evidence-based standards, and that results in significant 
functional impairment; and 
c. Prisoners diagnosed with an intellectual or developmental disability or other 
cognitive disorder that results in a significant functional impairment.136 
The settlement went into effect in March 2016 for what was initially set 
as a three-year term. This was later extended (in exchange for finally 
terminating the Mast litigation). So IPAS remains in implementation.137 This 
time, plaintiffs’ counsel reports significant success. Ken Falk, the ACLU 
lawyer who led this litigation, said, 
It has removed almost all seriously mentally ill prisoners from seg[regation]. 
There’s an exception for those who are deemed too dangerous to move and at 
any time there are 10 to 15 [prisoners in that category], but hundreds have been 
 
http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=11187 [https://perma.cc/J5MA-S6AL] [hereinafter IPAS 
Summary]. 
 133 No. 1:08-cv-01317-RLY-JMS, 2010 WL 1737821, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 27, 2010). 
 134 IPAS, 2012 WL 6738517, at *25. 
 135 See IPAS Summary, supra note 132. 
 136 Stipulation to Enter into Private Settlement Agreement at 15, Ind. Prot. & Advocacy Servs. 
Comm’n v. Comm’r, Ind. Dep’t of Corr., No. 1:08-cv-01317-TWP-MJD (S.D. Ind. Jan. 27, 2016), 
available at https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/MH-IN-0002-0013.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FCH4-L96E]. The agreement further defined “[re]cent significant history” and 
“[s]ignificant functional impairment.” Id. 
 137 See IPAS Summary, supra note 132. 
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removed. And many of them end up going through step down units and getting 
back into general population. So that has worked. But I do not think it has 
reduced markedly the number of other persons who are in segregation.138 
Court-filed status reports likewise document the general exclusion of 
prisoners who meet the class definition from ordinary solitary confinement; 
they are housed, instead, in units in which they receive increased out-of-cell 
time and therapeutic programming.139 A September 2018 site visit by a 
jointly chosen forensic psychologist concluded that, moreover, the mental 
health units “are no longer best understood as a way to get inmates out of 
restrictive housing. Basically they have become very appropriate ways to 
meet the mental health needs of inmates. I congratulate the parties for this 
achievement.”140 
But even assuming that the State reaches full compliance with the IPAS 
agreement (once the COVID-19 pandemic passes), what about prisoners who 
do not have serious mental illness? For them, as Falk reports above, Mast 
and IPAS have not accomplished much. There is no indication that use of 
solitary confinement is decreasing in Indiana.141 And length of stay is 
unusually high in Indiana as well.142 For prisoners who are not mentally ill, 
the incrementalist approach seems to fall far short. 
 
 138 Telephone Interview with Kenneth Falk, supra note 5. 
 139 See First Joint Status Report Following Effective Date of Private Settlement Agreement at 2, Ind. 
Prot. & Advocacy Servs. Comm’n v. Comm’r, Ind. Dep’t of Corr., No. 1:08-cv-01317-TWP-MJD, 
2012 WL 6738517 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 18, 2016), available at 
https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/MH-IN-0002-0016.pdf [https://perma.cc/J4RJ-T944]; 
Second Joint Status Report Following Effective Date of Private Settlement Agreement at 1–2, Ind. Prot. 
& Advocacy Servs. Comm’n v. Comm’r, Ind. Dep’t of Corr., No. 1:08-cv-01317-TWP-MJD, 2012 WL 
6738517 (S.D. Ind. July. 5, 2017), available at https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/MH-IN-
0002-0017.pdf [https://perma.cc/LYZ9-CBBG]; Third Joint Status Report Following Effective Date of 
Private Settlement Agreement at 1, Ind. Prot. & Advocacy Servs. Comm’n v. Comm’r, Ind. Dep’t of 
Corr., No. 1:08-cv-01317-TWP-MJD, 2012 WL 6738517 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 6, 2018), available at 
https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/MH-IN-0002-0018.pdf [https://perma.cc/PZG3-B899]. 
 140 Fourth Joint Status Report Following Effective Date of Private Settlement Agreement at 14, Ind. 
Prot. & Advocacy Servs. Comm’n v. Comm’r, Ind. Dep’t of Corr., No. 1:08-cv-01317-TWP-MJD, 
2012 WL 6738517 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 4, 2018), available at 
https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/MH-IN-0002-0019.pdf [https://perma.cc/4VAK-T4PG]. 
However, shortly after the September 2018 site visit, implementation hit an unexpected obstacle; the new 
unit was destroyed by a fire. Substitute space has made compliance impossible, leading the plaintiffs to 
seek another extension of the agreement. See Parties’ Further Status Report at 1, 4, Ind. Prot. & Advocacy 
Servs. Comm’n v. Comm’r, Ind. Dep’t of Corr., No. 1:08-cv-01317-TWP-MJD, 2012 WL 6738517 (S.D. 
Ind. Mar. 8, 2020), available at https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/MH-IN-0002-0020.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SD3W-CT5W]. 
 141 See supra Table 1. 
 142 Expert Report of Dan Pacholke at 15, Vermillion v. Levenhagen, No. 1:15-cv-605-RLY-TAB 
(S.D. Ind. Mar. 31, 2019), available at https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-IN-0025-
0001.pdf [https://perma.cc/JK3U-6RXY] (“IDOC has double the inmates serving 6 months to three years 
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Two more recent due process cases, both initiated by prisoners pro se, 
may make some limited headway for a broader population. In both, initial 
losses in district court were reversed by the Seventh Circuit, leading to large 
money damages on remand. Isby-Israel v. Wynn143 was brought by Aaron 
Isby-Israel—a very frequent litigant and one of the hunger strikers and 
named plaintiffs in the Taifa litigation.144 Isby-Israel had been in solitary 
confinement for over twenty-five years.145 He filed his case pro se but 
eventually attracted volunteer counsel. Although he lost an Eighth 
Amendment challenge to conditions, in 2017, he managed to reverse the 
State’s due process summary judgment on appeal.146 On remand, represented 
by “biglaw” litigator Daniel Kelley, Isby-Israel’s discovery uncovered that 
the periodic classification reviews promised by regulation were a sham: 
[P]eriodic reviews must be meaningful and cannot be a sham or pretext for 
indefinite segregation. They cannot rely only on past events, nor can they only 
include uninformative boilerplate language. In this case, periodic reviews must 
consider Mr. Isby’s current circumstances and future prospects, in addition to 
the reasons for his placement in solitary confinement when determining whether 
his continued solitary confinement is warranted. 
It is plain from the record that the 30-day reviews at Wabash Valley were 
perfunctory, meaningless, and not even rubber stamped. The identical forms 
with the same language were printed out each month by a single reviewer, a 
caseworker or casework manager. No factual basis or rationale is provided in 
the 30-day reviews, leaving the basis for “no changes” in status entirely 
unknown.147 
The IPAS litigation provided some of the evidence base for the case; 
the IPAS settlement required periodic mental health reviews of individuals 
in solitary, and those reviews helped substantiate Isby-Israel’s argument that 
he could safely be released from solitary.148 In December 2018, Isby-Israel 
 
in restrictive housing than the national average and it uses shorter 15 day to 3 months sanctions far less 
than the national average.”). 
 143 No. 2:12-cv-116-JMS-MJD, 2014 WL 2866197 (S.D. Ind. June 24, 2014). For additional 
resources and documents, see Isby-Israel v. Wynn, C.R. LITIG. CLEARINGHOUSE, 
https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17397 [https://perma.cc/86PR-UC2L]. 
 144 Isby-Israel was, in fact, one of the named plaintiffs who objected to that litigation’s 1994 
settlement, arguing that it was insufficiently advantageous to plaintiffs. See Isby v. Bayh, 75 F.3d 1191, 
1194 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 145 See Isby-Israel, supra note 115. 
 146 Isby v. Brown, 856 F.3d 508, 530 (7th Cir. 2017). 
 147 Isby-Israel v. Wynn, No. 2:12-cv-00116-JMS-MJD, slip op. at 23–24 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 19, 2018), 
available at https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-IN-0026-0001.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9H4W-LVYL]. 
 148 Telephone Interview with Dan Kelley, supra note 5. 
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won over $336,500 in compensatory and punitive damages, plus attorneys’ 
fees and an injunction directing his return to a general population (though 
“restricted movement”) unit.149 Appeal is pending.150 Soon thereafter, in 
Vermillion v. Plank,151 with the assistance of counsel recruited from the 
MacArthur Justice Center at Northwestern Pritzker School of Law, intense 
district court litigation in a similar case ended with a November 2019 
settlement of $425,000 in damages for long-term solitary prisoner Jay 
Vermillion.152 
These two damage actions could have several effects on solitary reform. 
They seem likely to encourage additional litigation including, perhaps, a 
class action. They may induce the actual implementation of the regulatory 
procedural protections. And they have generated substantial information on 
the state’s (non)compliance with solitary regulations. In addition to 
information that the state was not, in fact, conducting the required periodic 
reviews, an expert report in Vermillion offered Indiana access to developing 
best practices elsewhere. The expert, former Washington Department of 
Corrections head Dan Pacholke, rebuked Indiana’s practices. He noted that 
appropriate classification limits (those stemming from the Taifa litigation) 
were in place for “Department-Wide Administrative Segregation.”153 But, he 
wrote, “Facility Administrative Segregation” was far looser—allowed 
whenever “a documented history of behavior that causes staff to believe that 
that the offender’s continued presence in general population would be 
detrimental to the security of the facility, among others.”154 The report 
criticized this provision as far too general to induce appropriate 
classification, and documented abusive practices in the particular case in 
court—when vague suspicions relating to an attempted escape never led to a 
 
 149 Isby-Israel, No. 2:12-cv-00116-JMS-MJD, slip. op. at 36; Entry Approving Proposed Plan for 
Injunctive Relief & Retaining Jurisdiction over Action at 2, Isby-Israel v. Wynn, No. 2:12-cv-00116-
JMS-MJD (S.D. Ind. Mar. 4, 2019), available at https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-IN-
0026-0003.pdf [https://perma.cc/5UQ3-C2W4]. 
 150 Isby-Israel v. Brown, No. 19-01590 (7th Cir. filed Apr. 2, 2019). 
 151 1:15-cv-00605-RLY-TAB (S.D. Ind.). For additional resources and documents, see Vermillion v. 
Levenhagen, C.R. LITIG. CLEARINGHOUSE, https://clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17396 
[https://perma.cc/SVV9-AL5M]. Notwithstanding its docket number, Vermillion filed this case in 2011 
in the Northern District of Indiana. For the 2015 Seventh Circuit remand opinion, see Vermillion v. 
Levenhagen, 604 F. App’x 508 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 152 See Release & Settlement Agreement at 1, Vermillion v. Levenhagen, 1:15-cv-00605-RLY-TAB 
(S.D. Ind., Oct. 11, 2019), available at https://clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-IN-0025-0005.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ 6GDM-JBLL]. 
 153 Expert Report of Dan Pacholke at 17, Vermillion v. Levenhagen, No. 1:15-cv-605-RLY-TAB 
(S.D. Ind. Mar. 31, 2019), available at https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-IN-0025-
0001.pdf [https://perma.cc/UYJ3-XWG7]. 
 154 Id. 
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disciplinary charge but were instead the undisclosed motivation for long-
term administrative segregation.155 Moreover, he described conditions in 
solitary confinement as poor, writing of his 2018 site visit: “I find it 
surprising that given [the Indiana Department of Correction’s (IDOC)] 
history of being litigated against over super max conditions of confinement 
and the Human Rights Watch report issued more than two decades ago, that 
IDOC does not demonstrate more acuity around the condition and 
management of these units.”156 
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
It may help to summarize the accounts just presented in a timeline: 
TABLE 2: SOLITARY CONFINEMENT AND REFORM TIMELINE 
Nationwide Massachusetts Indiana 
1960s and 1970s: Litigated 
regulation of solitary confinement 
conditions 
  
1983: Marion lockdown, rise of 
modern supermax 
1988: Hoffer v. Fair 
regulates administrative 
solitary 
1991 and 1993: Supermaxes opened 
1995: Madrid v. Gomez (N.D. 
Cal.) decision holding solitary 
confinement not per se 
unconstitutional, though it may be 
for prisoners with mental illness 
1990s: MDOC revamps 
disciplinary solitary to 
escape Hoffer-related 
constraints 
1992: Taifa v. Bayh (N.D. Ind.) 
challenges supermax conditions; 
settlement reached in 1994, lasts 
until 2003 
1995: Sandin v. Conner (U.S.) 
holding short-term solitary 
confinement not a liberty 
deprivation triggering due process 
protections 
1998: Legal challenge 





2005: Wilkinson v. Austin (U.S.) 
holding long-term supermax 





2007: DLC v. MDOC 
filed, addressing 
solitary confinement of 
prisoners with serious 
mental illness; settled in 
2012; settlement lasts 
until 2015, when it is 
codified 
2005: Mast v. Donahue (S.D. Ind.) 
bars solitary confinement of 
prisoners with serious mental 
illness, but fails because it applies 
to only one prison 
 
2008: IPAS v. Commissioner (S.D. 
Ind.) seeks to extend bar to all 
prisoners with serious mental 
illness; settlement reached in 2016 
 
 155 Id. at 19–24. 
 156 Id. at 30. 
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Nationwide Massachusetts Indiana 
~2011–present: Return to 
wholesale litigation in some states 
2018: Criminal justice 
reform includes 
significant and broad 
limits on solitary 
confinement 
2012: Isby-Israel v. Wynn (S.D. 
Ind.) filed; concluded in 2018; 
granting damages and injunctive 
relief for long-term solitary prisoner 
because reclassifications were a 
sham 
 
2015: Vermillion v. Plank (S.D. 
Ind.) filed; settled in 2019; similar 
to Isby-Israel 
 
Neither of the case studies just presented offers any sign that the 
litigated amelioration of solitary confinement in Massachusetts and Indiana 
has been perverse. That is, there is no indication in either state that the 
special-populations approach has entrenched or legitimated solitary 
confinement more broadly. Neither state has seen a recent increase in the use 
of solitary confinement or reported worsening of conditions in solitary. 
But Massachusetts seems poised on the verge of broad solitary 
confinement reform, and Indiana does not. Why? It seems to me (and to 
my—highly informed—interview subjects157) that the primary reason is that 
in Indiana, the litigators are on their own. To quote Amy Fettig, the former 
director of the ACLU’s Stop Solitary campaign, Indiana “had successful 
litigation, but there was no ground game.” It is all but impossible to achieve 
real change without “a social movement to support you,” she says.158 
Indiana’s political culture lacks such movement actors. That lack is far from 
random: generally, Indiana is far more politically conservative than 
Massachusetts.159 As Dan Kelley, who won over $300,000 for Aaron Isby-
Israel, said, “I have a hard time thinking how political [solitary confinement 
reform] would be feasible in this state. Reform has to happen through the 
courts.”160 And more specifically, there is simply no effective out-of-court 
prisoners’ rights activism. Maggie Filler, who won over $400,000 for her 
client Jay Vermillion, explained, “I do think that there’s a lack of grassroots 
groups making noise.”161 Without out-of-court backup, Indiana’s state 
 
 157 See list of interviewees, supra note 5. 
 158 Amy Fettig, How Do We Reach a National Tipping Point in the Campaign to Stop Solitary?, 
115 NW. U. L. REV. 311 (2020); Telephone Interview with Amy Fettig, supra note 5.  
 159 In Massachusetts, in 2018, self-described liberals outnumbered self-described conservatives 35% 
to 21%; in Indiana, the proportions were more than reversed: liberals were outnumbered by conservatives 
17% to 39%. Jeffrey M. Jones, Conservatives Greatly Outnumber Liberals in 19 U.S. States, GALLUP 
(Feb. 22, 2019), https://news.gallup.com/poll/247016/conservatives-greatly-outnumber-liberals-
states.aspx [https://perma.cc/M6N7-72V5]. 
 160 Telephone Interview with Dan Kelley, supra note 5. 
 161 Telephone Interview with Maggie Filler, supra note 5. 
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government is not pressured to learn from its litigation losses. No allies in 
the legislature pick up settlement terms and run with them. No large-scale 
protests force the state to justify its practices. 
The point is not that litigation fails in these circumstances. It may well 
be that litigation has greatly improved the lives of Indiana prisoners with 
serious mental illness who are avoiding solitary confinement. And future 
litigation may actually induce the substitution of real process for the current 
“perfunctory, meaningless, and not even rubber stamped” reviews of 
prisoners in solitary.162 There may even be some small additional benefits 
caused by litigation’s role in bringing new kinds of officials into the system. 
To quote Kenneth Falk, “There are mental health positions now within the 
DOC that never existed before. [There’s a] guy . . . who sort of rides herd on 
all of this; that wasn’t a position that they had [before]. I think that makes a 
difference.”163 
But for litigation to trigger something much bigger—broad reform or 
significant steps towards solitary abolition—requires more. In 
Massachusetts, the political ecosystem has many more reform-minded 
participants—activists, lawyers, judges, legislators—than does the much 
redder Indiana. Each such participant can build on the others. In 
Massachusetts, litigation’s strengths can emerge, among them information 
generation, thoughtful policy development (in settlement terms), publicity, 
and storytelling. Weaknesses—the detachment of litigation from 
mobilization, hyper-empowerment of lawyers, undue affection for process—
are ameliorated by other actors and other actions. The Indiana ecosystem is 
far sparser. 
In my view, the most likely path to abolition or near-abolition of solitary 
confinement will create and then build on incremental change. The point is 
both technocratic and also jurisprudential. Jurisprudentially, consider a 2015 
concurring opinion inviting broad Eighth Amendment challenges to solitary 
confinement, in which Justice Kennedy wrote: 
[R]esearch still confirms what this Court suggested over a century ago: Years 
on end of near-total isolation exact a terrible price . . . . In a case that presented 
the issue, the judiciary may be required, within its proper jurisdiction and 
authority, to determine whether workable alternative systems for long-term 
confinement exist, and, if so, whether a correctional system should be required 
to adopt them.164 
 
 162 Isby-Israel v. Wynn, No. 2:12-cv-00116-JMS-MJD, slip op. at 23–24 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 19, 2018), 
available at https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-IN-0026-0001.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9H4W-LVYL]. 
 163 Telephone Interview with Kenneth Falk, supra note 5. 
 164 Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2210 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
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That is, abolishing solitary is more feasible—and may even be found to be 
constitutionally compelled—if “workable alternative systems for long-term 
confinement exist.” 
More technocratically, solitary confinement’s persistence in American 
corrections policy is attributable in part to officials believing in its efficacy 
as an antidote to in-prison violence. I think that belief is incorrect, but to 
address it will take persuasion as well as politics. And incremental reforms 
can be persuasive for all the reasons touched on throughout this Essay; they 
can demonstrate the possibilities, building both reform capacity and 
credibility. They introduce, as well, some much needed humility: the 
asserted “need” for solitary confinement is undermined by every day that 
passes without incident for a person who was previously said to need solitary 
confinement. 
To use the language of left theory, it seems to me that the kinds of 
incremental reforms undertaken in Massachusetts and Indiana have the 
potential to be “nonreformist reforms”: reforms that avoid the reformist trap 
of legitimizing an unjust system, instead “reduc[ing] the power of an 
oppressive system while illuminating the system’s inability to solve the 
crises it creates.”165 How do nonreformist reforms work? To quote Professor 
Mark Tushnet, who was writing more generally, if reforms truly are to be 
“nonreformist,” they must either “set in train a larger transformation of the 
political system,” or “the effort to secure such reforms might mobilize people 
to seek additional reforms, even if the particular effort fails or if it produces 
legislation that is itself not really a reform.”166 Reforms fail to be 
“nonreformist” if they are too tame—but if they are too aggressive, they 
simply fail. Again, quoting Professor Tushnet, they must be “not far out of 
line with the ordinary legislative product of an unreformed political system, 
so political activists can realistically place them on the political agenda.”167 
In Massachusetts, there is, right now, the possibility that a nonreformist 
reform of solitary confinement is underway. In Indiana, not so much. But in 
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